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Research Opportunities in China

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Research Opportunities in China for American Humanists and Social Scientists

Edited by Kenneth Prewitt

The report of the American Humanities
and Social Science Planning Commission,
appointed as part of the program of the
Committee on Scholarly Communication
with the People's Republic of China
(CSCPRC), sponsored by the American
Council of Learned Societies, the
National Academy of Sciences, and the
Social Science Research Council

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The views expressed in this report are those of the American Humanities and Social Science Planning Commission, whose visit to China was part of the 1981 exchange program of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC). The CSCPRC is sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies, the National Academy of Sciences, and the Social Science Research Council. The views are those of the members of the Planning Commission and not necessarily those of its sponsoring organizations.

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FOREWORD

In the spring of 1979 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) sent to the United States a delegation of leading humanistic and social science scholars. (The term "social science" in China embraces disciplines which in American scholarship fall under the parent terms of "humanities" and "social sciences.") This Chinese delegation conversed with several hundred American scholars and academic administrators in research universities, libraries, academies, centers, and institutes. The Chinese repeatedly emphasized the importance of increasing the flow of scholars, books, and ideas between the United States and the People's Republic of China. American scholars responded enthusiastically to the prospect.

One small part of this enthusiastic response developed into an American Humanities and Social Science Planning Commission. The Commission had in hand a generous invitation from Hu Quiaomu, president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, to reciprocate the visit of the CASS delegation with a group of American scholars broadly representative of the humanistic and social science disciplines. The Commission went to China in early 1981 and subsequently prepared this report to the American academic community and to the funders of scholarly exchanges with the People's Republic.

Twelve humanists and social scientists and one natural

scientist formed the Commission. The membership was balanced between China specialists and scholars who had, at best, an amateur's knowledge of China. The non-China scholars included persons with experience in developing scholarly exchanges with Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. (The names of the Commission members are listed in the front of this report.)

Perhaps the most trying challenge in scholarly exchange programs is finding a delicate balance between a respect for indigenous intellectual traditions and a commitment to the international principles of scholarly practice. If experience elsewhere is a guide, Sino-American scholarly exchanges will pass through a stage in which Chinese officials will fear social research, claiming it to be intrusive and threatening. This will be accompanied by the assertion that the humanities and the social sciences are so much a part of the culture to which they belong that only an indigenously generated scholarship can accurately examine the questions which concern these disciplines. Outsiders will not always be welcome, especially if they insist on their own canons of scholarship. Political conditions within each of the countries and certainly political relations between the countries will intrude. Although we should expect these developments, experience elsewhere has taught scholars that to give in either to exaggerated claims of indigenization or to political controls over scholarship is to undermine the very reasons for establishing scholarly exchanges in the first place.

American experience elsewhere teaches us that scholarly exchange cannot achieve its promise, and indeed may fail to achieve much of anything, unless each country has a sense of its own purposes as well as the purposes of the other country. Consequently, the Commission identified several broad tasks for itself: first, to reflect on the intellectual context within China that is giving rise to the particular constellation of research priorities, institutional arrangements, and goals for the exchange programs in the humanities and the social sciences; second, to offer the

Commission's judgment of a central American purpose for the exchange relationship; and third, to formulate principles and strategies which might guide how American scholars can approach scholarly exchange opportunities in the intermediate future.¹

The report which follows is a report of the full Commission. Although, as is often the case with collective reports, not every member will agree with the tone or emphasis of every sentence, there is remarkable agreement about the basic posture of the report. The Commission met in a two-day briefing session before it went to China (see Appendix A). At this session it clarified the issues it intended to address. The Commission spent approximately three weeks in China (see Appendix A for the itinerary). Every member of the Commission prepared notes and position papers which went into an early draft of this report. There was a review session several months after returning from China. A writing committee of Michel Oksenberg and Kenneth Prewitt was assigned to coordinate the draft materials, and Prewitt assumed responsibility for preparing the final version.

Interested scholars who read earlier drafts of the report, and whose criticisms and comments are reflected in the

¹ The report addresses only one aspect of cultural and scientific activity between the two countries: scholarly exchanges in the humanities and the social sciences (and the Commission blurs rather than distinguishes between these two parent terms). Unattended to, then, is the flow of persons in the visual and performing arts: art, dance, drama, film, music. Nor do we examine exchanges in the applied social sciences being managed by nonacademic agencies: the Department of Commerce's technical assistance to the Chinese census, industrial management exchanges with private industry, World Bank programs in finance. The report is limited in a second way: it treats the bilateral relationship between the United States and China as if there were no multilateral considerations in the scholarly exchange programs. We know better, but could not attend to all issues. We apologize to our many colleagues around the world who are as committed as we are to establishing a global community of scholars enjoying research access throughout the world.

The Task of the Commission

1

The attention of American humanists and social scientists is turned toward China now as perhaps never before. The reasons are obvious. Having been denied contact with Chinese on the mainland since the end of World War II, scholars are eager to take advantage of the resumption of normal relations between the United States and China. Anthropologists can now study life in China other than through refugee informants; archeologists can visit important sites; economists can acquire new economic data and check on their accuracy; historians can use archives unavailable in Taiwan; linguists can study firsthand how language is used in China; political scientists can interview persons making political decisions. In addition to these research opportunities—which could be paralleled in many branches of the natural sciences, from astronomy to zoology—American academic administrators as well as university teachers look forward to having Chinese students in their classrooms and laboratories.

Renewed opportunities for research coincide with the revitalization of scholarship within China. From 1966 to 1976—some would say from the 1950s on—Chinese aca-

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democratic institutions labored under severe political constraints. The Cultural Revolution and its aftermath battered scholarly endeavor. Since 1976, however, a rebirth of sorts has begun in the humanities and social sciences. Disciplinary research is being revived. Publications are being resumed. Professional associations are being reestablished. Scholarly works in all disciplines and traditions are being translated in significant numbers. American academics can again contemplate the happy prospect of having Chinese colleagues.

These scholarly developments have occurred concurrently with the growing importance of China in world affairs. China's performance in the decades ahead in agriculture, population planning, foreign trade, and foreign policy will affect the United States as well as the rest of the world. It is clear that humanity has embarked on a task which Western thinkers at least since Voltaire have speculated about—the implications of incorporating a dynamic China, with its nearly a quarter of the world's population, into the global community.

The case for an adequate understanding of China is too obvious to require elaboration. The Commission's focus, therefore, is on the next step—the part which an exchange program can play in furthering this understanding. And we have specifically been concerned with the appropriate role of the humanistic and social science disciplines, that part of the nation's intellectual system which is responsible for comprehending the human experience. This responsibility is not easily fulfilled unless we come to terms with China. Because of its size and the antiquity and achievements of its civilization, China is a major part of human history and the human experience. The challenge of understanding China, of mapping its experiences, and of incorporating this knowledge into the social sciences and humanities is one which this period happily presents to us.

These early hopes for normalization have in many respects been fulfilled. Several hundred humanists and social scientists have visited China in the last few years, many on

short delegation visits, some for more extended lecture trips, and a not insignificant number for language instruction and extended research. Meanwhile, senior Chinese scholars have visited the United States, as members of delegations, to attend workshops and conferences, and to plan even more extended programs. In recent years, thousands of Chinese students and scholars have studied in our universities; there is an effort by the Chinese to increase this flow while changing its composition toward more graduate study and increasing the proportion of students from the humanities and the social sciences. Many American universities are eager to facilitate this flow, and over 50 have entered into formal agreements with Chinese counterparts.

If it is easy to be enthusiastic about the enormous advances in scholarly exchange in what, as these things go, has been a brief period, it is also prudent to ask how the American scholarly community can make the wisest use of the historic opportunity presented by the normalization of academic relations between the two countries. This underlying question led to the formation of the Humanities and Social Science Planning Commission.

The Commission was not a negotiating delegation. Already involved in negotiation are several experienced organizations, including the U.S.–China Joint Commission on Science and Technology; the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China; and dozens of universities, foundations, and scientific institutions negotiating different pieces of what collectively is the scholarly exchange program with China. The delegation was also not an evaluation team, trying to sort out what had been done well and what not so well in the early years of the exchange program. A major review of the educational exchanges in United States universities, under the sponsorship of the International Communication Agency,¹ was al-

¹ See Ralph N. Clough, *A Review of the U.S.–China Exchange Program* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Research, U.S. International Communication Agency, 1981).

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ready under way, and the delegation had no interest in setting up a competing evaluation.

The delegation might have become another “map-making” expedition, adding to the literature on the leadership and institutional patterns now emerging in the humanities and social sciences in China.¹ Preliminary descriptive and interpretive maps exist, although they rapidly become dated as the Chinese add, subtract, rearrange, and redirect their personnel and their research institutions. It will be some years before academic arrangements in China are sufficiently settled that a comprehensive map can be provided. We chose not to become a map-making expedition, using instead the maps which had been provided by previous delegations and individuals and only incidentally updating them when relevant information came to our attention.

The Commission, then, was free to pursue a task of its own choosing. It chose a simple task: set out the American purpose to be served by the Sino–American scholarly exchange program. In the judgment of the Commission, the program should have as one of its central purposes the long-term research and training interests of American humanists and social scientists. This includes the interests of scholars who have a peripheral, but not thereby scientifically trivial, research interest in China, as well as those present and future scholars for whom China is the focus of their research careers.

The Commission does not believe this purpose can be realized unless Americans understand some of the intellectual traditions in China, as well as the purposes which the Chinese have set for themselves in the exchange program. Accordingly, the report is also an interpretive essay

¹ See Anne F. Thurston and Jason H. Parker, editors, *Humanistic and Social Science Research in China* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1980); see also the section on “Social Sciences” in Leo A. Orleans, editor, *Science in Contemporary China* (Stanford University Press, 1980), page 475–532.

attempting to explicate the context for realizing American purposes.

In stating American purposes so bluntly, we do not recommend indifference to the Chinese interests; as the report makes clear, the Commission is genuinely supportive of many of the goals which the Chinese have set for themselves. We welcome the opportunity to participate in programs which jointly serve both Chinese and American purposes. Many such opportunities present themselves. More should be encouraged. Throughout the exchange program, however, a clear vision of American scholarly purposes should be maintained. Such is the central message of this report.

The report is written with several American audiences in mind: individual scholars planning their research careers who need information about the possibilities for sustained research in China; academic administrators engaged in or contemplating an exchange relationship with the Chinese, and who want a program which will protect scholarly interests; funders or potential funders, who have to make the very difficult allocation decisions which so substantially affect which parts of the world will be well-studied and from the perspective of which disciplines; and government officials who, the Commission feels, should insulate the scholarly exchange program as much as possible from the ups and downs, twists and turns, of formal political relations between the United States and China.

The Commission, in drafting this report, was aware that it will be read by our friends and colleagues in China. This has not altered what we have to say, for the more candid each side is in presenting its concerns as well as its aspirations, the sooner will both sides move toward those conditions of openness without which a global scholarly community cannot exist. □

Differences Between the American and Chinese Scholarly Communities

2

Before visiting China, the Commission reviewed the problems with which scholarly exchange programs were coping: language inadequacies on both sides; the “lost” generation of scholars in China; library and archival access difficulties as well as the deteriorated condition of archives and research facilities in China; funding for us as well as for the Chinese; the difficulties of working out field research arrangements in China; the seeming intractability of the reciprocity question; the plurality of uncoordinated programs being initiated by American universities, foundations, and research institutions; and the broader issues reflected in the discussion of the historical and current context outlined in Chapter 4.

The members of the Commission, both those who had already worked in China and those with experience in other nations, did not view the familiar litany of problems as insurmountable. The spectacular advances of the exchange programs in only a few years and the promise of expanding opportunities led to the working assumption that problems could be talked through and progress made. On this score,

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the Commission was not disappointed. In many respects, the report reflects continued support for building scholarly exchanges between the United States and China and expresses confidence that good will and steady effort by all will gradually lessen many of the difficulties involved. It is important that readers not lose sight of this point, for on the whole the tone of the report is cautious. The Commission was much sobered by what it learned. Its enthusiasm and its confidence are guarded.

In the judgment of the Commission, establishing meaningful exchanges in the humanities and social sciences is greatly complicated by the lack of common understanding about the scholarly enterprise. Chinese and American scholars may use similar terms, "humanities" and "social sciences," but the intellectual premises, assumptions, purposes, and limitations—the "mind-set"—invoked by these terms only partially translate across the cultural boundaries.

We do not insist that a common understanding of the humanistic and social science scholarly enterprise is necessary for finding convergent or mutually reinforcing interests in an exchange program. An exchange program can serve the interests of each party even in the absence of shared intellectual premises. But it is not easy, and it is particularly not easy if either side, let alone both, naively assumes an understanding which is, in fact, not there.

The very difficult challenge facing U.S.–China scholarly exchange is obvious: construct a program which promotes both American and Chinese scholarly interests under conditions in which the two sides generally have different understandings of what the humanities and social sciences have been, are, and hope to become. Stated more bluntly, how do we keep the lack of shared understanding from becoming an active misunderstanding which might then prevent either side from realizing legitimate and not necessarily opposing interests?

There are two dimensions along which we can most easily see the differences which separate the two academic

communities: different views of the tasks of scholarship and different understandings of the *t'i-yung* distinction.

The task of scholarship. In China, much more so than in the United States, political-bureaucratic processes set research agendas which focus on the development goals articulated by national leaders. The ideological and nation-building goals which scholars are expected to serve determine which ideas from the West are acceptable and which are to be avoided. Following a two-year period of uncertainty, the national leadership in 1979 proscribed Chinese advocacy of any ideas which challenge four inviolable principles for the nation's development: (1) adherence to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought; (2) pursuit of the socialist road; (3) acceptance of the dictatorship of the proletariat; and (4) recognition of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Within these boundaries, the Western humanities and social sciences can be studied and used.

These political and ideological considerations give us a broader perspective with which to understand scholarship in China and to view the possible differences between the research communities. In China, the core humanities and social science disciplines are generally organized in a manner which will serve national development. It is of course not a historical novelty that research and training institutions, methodologies and analytic approaches, funds and the purposes to which they are deployed, and related aspects of the "knowledge system" are expected to serve national goals. Many American scholars worked on depression-related issues in the 1930s, on war-related problems in the 1940s, and on productivity issues today. Similar examples could be drawn from the experiences of other nations—communist and noncommunist, developed and developing. But in important respects what we now witness in China is on a far different scale.

At all levels and involving nearly every discipline, scholars are working on problems presented by modernizing a socialist state. In the most fundamental sense, China's

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scholars are explicating the meaning of socialist modernization. What is it? How is it to be achieved? Philosophy is expected to help demonstrate that current policies, while appearing to depart from practices pursued during Mao's last years, still are rooted in the Marxist-Leninist tradition. Historians reconsider past events and leaders in the light of present needs for legitimacy and continuity. The more technical aspects of the more technical of the social sciences—economics, management, parts of political science and sociology—are being organized to provide the information and techniques relevant to basic shifts in public policy.

The disciplines which collectively define the humanities and the social sciences are, in China, less likely to be treated as scholarly disciplines with an intellectual life of their own than as extensions of the administrative and ideological life of the nation. We should realize, accordingly, that some of the words used by Chinese and Americans may be the same—rehabilitating libraries, training the next generation of scholars, importing the latest research techniques—but organizing programs for the purposes of modernizing Chinese society and economy has different implications than developing humanistic and social science disciplines on their own terms and at their own pace.

It would be easy, and misleading, to overstate this point. Certainly there are individual Chinese anthropologists, historians, linguists, and sociologists whose goal it is to pursue research ideas and develop their disciplines. Disciplinary associations are being organized to reestablish professional standards. But taken as a whole and looked at through the layer of officialdom, academic and otherwise, we see intellectuals in the service of doctrine and officially sanctioned goals. Doctrine may change—peasant communism giving way to Soviet socialism in turn replaced by the Cultural Revolution ideology which is now superseded by the four modernizations—but just as in the traditional Confucian state, the task of ideas, and thus of those who present and elaborate ideas, is to serve more than to challenge or to question national policy.

The t' i-yung distinction. As practiced in the United States, the humanities and the social sciences generally hold that an understanding of social theories—and certainly their application—requires familiarity with the process of their development. It is a working assumption of American scholarship that there are no theories without knowledge of the historical facts which make them so, as well as knowledge of the methodologies through which these facts are brought to bear on theoretical formulations.

Many Chinese seem willing to believe otherwise, thus allowing China to borrow and adapt to its purposes theories, models, or research techniques—while rejecting some of the associated premises and features of the intellectual system which produced them. This mode of cross-cultural borrowing can be traced to the 1880s and the earliest Chinese encounters with Western technology. At that time, the Chinese hoped to borrow Western learning for its use (*yung*), while preserving a Chinese essence (*t'i*). The *t'i-yung* distinction, which many Western scholars question, remains one with which many Chinese remain comfortable.

Dealing with the differences. We emphasize the deep roots of the differences between the academic traditions in order to caution Americans against attributing differences to recent events in China. It is tempting to believe that the differences which separate the Chinese and the American academic communities result from the disruption in China's academic development and that, consequently, as the Chinese renew their humanistic and social science scholarly traditions, the differences will gradually disappear. This assumption is without foundation, and basing an exchange program on the hope that the differences will disappear is to court great disappointment.

It is true, of course, that the disruption of China's intellectual life occurred just as profound changes were taking place in humanistic and social science scholarship elsewhere in the world. In the last 30 years, for instance, the humanities and social science disciplines have greatly

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accelerated an international perspective in their scholarship. "Area studies" ceased to be the preserve of anthropologists in search of exotic cultures or of linguists seeking opportunities for comparative research. Western scholarship began to take seriously the histories and cultures, the politics and economics of other societies. The previous decades have also been a period in which quantitative techniques for gathering and analyzing data have been developed. For a time this caused some rupture in the natural linkages which connect the humanities and the social sciences, a rupture which is now being closed as both humanists and social scientists come to respect as well as to appreciate the limitations of quantification. Even more dramatic in the last few decades has been the formation of new disciplines, subdisciplines, and specializations: to name but a few, biological bases of behavior, cognitive psychology, critical theory, operations research, policy studies, public choice, semiotics, sociolinguistics, and survey research.

China has been largely isolated from the social sciences and humanities as these substantial transformations have occurred. Is it possible that the differences between the disciplines and those now practiced in China simply reflect too little contact between China and the West for the last 30 or 40 years? While this observation has some truth, the Commission does not believe that the differences between the academic communities will evaporate as China "catches up" with the West.

The Commission also cautions against the temptation to target programs only or even primarily to the relatively few areas in which Chinese-American differences are minimal and in which overlapping interests are greatest. Excessive targeting would introduce the Chinese to a narrow part of the American academic community, failing thereby to acquaint them with the full range of our disciplines, methodologies, practices, and scholarly goals. Targeting would also expose American scholars to China selectively. Although there would be short-term advantages, such as establishing cooperative programs and gaining some, if

limited, access to China, the longer-term consequences are less attractive. Selective exposure, on both sides, to those areas of academic cooperation identified by common values or linked interests would isolate entire segments of both scholarly communities from contact with the other. Many areas of important scholarly activity would be barred from participation in the exchange of ideas and people. This would perpetuate and perhaps increase already serious differences. □

What Should a Scholarly Exchange Program Actually “Exchange”?

3

The present academic exchange program is serving so many worthwhile goals that it is not easy to identify a broader vision that might provide coherence to its many parts. But reflection about goals and objectives is necessary. The Chinese are sending mixed signals—insisting on being treated as intellectual equals, while asking help from American academicians; proclaiming commitment to doctrines such as “truth from facts,” while imposing severe constraints on research access; arguing that the humanities and social sciences must be grown on Chinese soil by Chinese, while seeking the most advanced techniques from Western scholars. It is not easy to navigate on the basis of these mixed signals. It is nearly impossible unless each side has a sense of its own objectives and interests. For the United States, the initial step is understanding what it is that is actually to be exchanged in an exchange program.

Many Americans and Chinese who have been involved in exchanges thus far seem to believe that what is to be gained are “modern” techniques of social scientific and humanistic (and, by implication, natural scientific) research, particu-

larly those that seem relevant to the immediate problems of China's development. A different goal of the exchange program, also widely sought by both Chinese and Americans, is to improve political relations between the two countries. A third goal (sought by a minority on both sides, but probably by a larger number of Americans than Chinese) is to improve the capacity of scholars from both countries to understand the modern world and thus to improve our ability to live in it.

Until questions of goals and benefits are settled, or at least clarified far more than they are now, any program designed to promote scholarly relations in the social sciences and humanities between the United States and China exists rather in a limbo, prey to unfortunate misunderstandings and disappointed expectations.

The view that the objective is the transfer of modern techniques from the United States to China—techniques that are presumptively useful for increasing national wealth and power—has obvious attractions. The transfer of technologies and theoretical models is, after all, what the Chinese seem to want most from the United States; and why should the Chinese not define what they want to import, in the humanities and social sciences, no less than in engineering or consumer products or cultural events? The “technology transfer” model also is one to which many Americans naturally respond. Have Americans in the past not gone in large numbers to less developed nations to teach, lecture, set up training programs, and introduce the latest techniques? Is this not what the missionaries for modernization, including not only World Bank and AID representatives but many American scholars as well, have had as their purpose for the last 30 years? Many scholars who have already journeyed to China have been motivated by the desire to “be helpful to China’s modernization program” by sharing with the Chinese the latest research techniques and becoming involved in China’s training and rebuilding programs.

Despite these seeming attractions, the Commission does

not endorse a view of exchanges which inevitably would be asymmetrical. The techniques in question, from input-output analysis to survey procedures, raise the *t'i-yung* question in the most acute form. Can they be exported to China unless the Chinese acquire the "essence" of the disciplines in which they are rooted? Moreover, virtually all such techniques are ones which the United States supposedly possesses and China lacks. The flow of knowledge and capacity would be predominantly one way. A major problem for the receiving society would be how to persuade the sending one to sustain and expand so unbalanced a process. So far, this has been accomplished by appealing—sometimes openly, more often obliquely—to American foreign policy interests, to moral issues inherent in the vast discrepancy in living levels between the two countries, and to the intense desire of American scholars to experience contemporary China directly, even if imperfectly and in limited ways.

If the "technology transfer" view of exchanges continues and develops, the predictable result will be increasing disappointment on the Chinese side as the expected results do not appear and an increasing frustration on ours as the flow of firsthand knowledge of contemporary China remains a thin trickle. Moreover, over the long run, the Chinese are likely to weary of a relationship that casts them almost exclusively as recipients. The pre-1949 pattern of foreign paternalism and Chinese dependency should be avoided.

The second view—that academic exchanges should strengthen United States foreign policy interests—also has its proponents. Unfortunately, this assertion provides little guidance because it can lead to very different policy prescriptions. Those who view China primarily as a communist country consider it to be an adversary; for them, scholarly exchanges should be discouraged or at least limited to areas that erode Marxism-Leninism in China or illuminate the seamier side of Chinese society.

A different foreign policy perspective places China essentially in the North-South context. China's quest for eco-

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conomic development, for energy and agricultural self-sufficiency, is in the United States interest, since disparity between the developed and developing countries is a major source of global instability. From this perspective, scholarly exchanges should be encouraged, with emphasis on those areas that may assist China's modernization: econometrics, industrial management, law, and so on.

Yet another foreign policy perspective places China in the context of the global balance of power. A Sino-American strategic alignment would bring stability to East Asia and offset increasing Soviet strength. From this perspective, scholarly exchanges should be managed so that they do not create needless irritants to the relationship. Moreover, scholarship should facilitate the efforts by leaders on both sides to expand the areas of Sino-American cooperation. This would entail collaborative policy studies, improved language training programs, and high-level academic contacts irrespective of scientific content.

Because the United States government will play such an important role in funding scholarly exchanges with China, and because, as noted above, scholarly developments in China are under close government supervision, foreign policy considerations will never be absent in determining the magnitude and emphasis of the exchange program. But a scholarly exchange program explicitly based on political costs and benefits is a hostage to political events. Those who manage exchanges would have to speculate about the bureaucratic fate in the foreign policy apparatus (of either country) of components of the exchange program. Inaccurate forecasts, which are at least as likely as good guesses, would disrupt rather than protect the exchange program. Moreover, an exchange designed to serve particular United States foreign policy interests would probably deprive itself of some of our best scholars who either do not share those interests or who believe scholarship and politics do not mix. To be sure, foreign policy considerations will shape the relationship; this is unavoidable. But rather than subordinate exchanges to foreign policy goals, the Commission

strongly recommends insulating exchanges from the vicissitudes of American–Chinese relations.

The Commission rejects both “technology transfer” and “foreign policy” purposes as bases on which to construct an exchange program. It emphasizes, instead, an exchange program which will contribute to a scholarly understanding of the world—how we got to where we are, what are the limitations to which we must adjust, and what are the possibilities toward which we should reach.

Establishing such an exchange program is not a simple matter, especially when the scholarly values at the core of the program are understood differently in the two countries. What the United States can do, however, is to define its own objectives in a way consistent with this conception, and pursue these objectives in as reasonable and unambiguous a fashion as possible. From the American perspective, the exchange program should serve the research and training needs of the humanists and social scientists who constitute the nation’s China specialists: providing access to archives, materials, sites, and the life of the Chinese people, and upgrading language abilities by expanding the number of American scholars trained in Chinese languages. A successful program will also provide non-China specialists those scholarly opportunities that will hasten the incorporation of China’s experience, from ancient times to the present period, into the general study of the human condition. Isolation from the history and contemporary development of this rich, diversified civilization stunts inquiry into topics as diverse as the history of science, the decline of bureaucratic empires, the anatomy of peasant revolutions, or the decision-making processes in centrally planned economies.

In emphasizing American scholarly interests, we assume that the exchange program will continue to cooperate with the Chinese as they develop their own humanities and social sciences. This objective is now receiving substantial funds and is being actively pursued, both by American programs in China and by the training of Chinese in American universities. This objective, up to a point, merits sup-

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port on its own terms. But the Commission believes that cooperating with Chinese purposes should be pursued in the context of the American objectives already noted. Obviously, it is in the interests of American scholarship on China to have access to colleagues in China whose research and writings interpret their own society. And it is in the interest of American scholars to have colleagues with whom collaboration is possible, although for many humanistic and social science disciplines, meaningful scholarly collaboration—jointly designed projects, perhaps even comparative in design—will for the most part have to wait for a cohort of scholars which has just begun its graduate training.

It is not likely that meaningful collaboration can be realized until the Chinese develop a more accurate understanding of American society—including our intellectual traditions and academic practices—than they presently have. The Chinese, of course, recognize that their isolation from the West, and especially the disruption of the Cultural Revolution, left them with very dated knowledge of the United States, and, more often, stereotypes and images which derive from ideology and “mind-set” rather than from serious study. It is in our academic as well as national interest to assist them—by providing lecturers, curricular materials, books, and training—as they establish American studies programs and begin to train a new generation of American specialists.

There are obvious and legitimate purposes to be served by cooperating with the Chinese and their goals. Nevertheless, we return to our central argument. Failure to serve American scholarly interests will compromise and eventually undermine the very reasons for establishing an exchange program in the first place.

We realize, of course, the irony that, if fully realized, our scholarly objectives would in some ways change the China we seek to study. A China that would permit open inquiry into its history or its communes or its bureaucratic practices would no longer be the China we know (or do not know)

today. The American pressure to conduct independent research becomes an unwitting instrument of social change. For that reason, we should not expect fully to attain our objectives. Furthermore, to design a program or to adopt objectives in order to “change China” is, in the judgment of the Commission, seriously misguided. Not misguided, however, would be a program designed to apply the best available American scholarship to an understanding of China. □

The Context for Realizing American Objectives

4

All Commission reports find it easier to state objectives than to explain how to realize them. In subsequent chapters, this report will outline a broad strategy and eliminate a few contending strategies. But we do not wish to consider strategies and recommendations too quickly. The exchange program will realize its objectives only if its funders, administrators, and participants have a working knowledge of how the concrete Chinese context shapes and limits scholarly opportunities. This chapter, therefore, offers observations about this context. While a few pages cannot pretend to analyze China, even they can raise to a conscious level the importance of both the historical and the contemporary context.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The present scholarly exchange program with China does not occur in a historical vacuum. In both countries, persons giving leadership to the exchange program have views of what was right and wrong, what worked and failed, in prior efforts to establish scholarly cooperation.

Chinese recollections

There is of course no single Chinese view of the pre-1949 American involvement in China's intellectual life. Some Chinese stress the benefits, primarily recalling American generosity and openness: the Boxer indemnity fund; academic standards established at Harvard-Yenching, Tsinghua, and St. John's; John Dewey's stimulation of both educational reform and empirical studies; the graduate training and personal friendships made at Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Wisconsin, and other universities which trained large numbers of Chinese scholars in the prewar years. But often even these favorable memories are clouded. Some American-trained Chinese vividly recall a condescending and patronizing attitude on the part of American scholars. They recall poverty, racial prejudice, and isolation at American universities. They are convinced that close connections linked American scholars in China with the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek.

Memories, therefore, are mixed—leading some Chinese to be highly optimistic about the present exchanges, and others to approach the “new opportunity” with suspicion and apprehension. These memories are not without consequences. Many of the Chinese who manage present Sino-American exchanges in the social sciences and humanities are China's “old America hands.” Recalling the pre-1949 involvement of Western universities and scholars in China's own intellectual life, the present leaders routinely affirm the relevance of Western humanists and social scientists to Chinese development strategies. They attribute the wealth and power of the West in part to its intellectual accomplishments and educational systems. They believe lessons exist for China.

This remarkable eagerness to catch up, to contribute to the universal intellectual experience, is tempered, however, by other concerns. Westernized Chinese intellectuals, particularly in the humanities and the social sciences, suffered

much political persecution because of their Western taint. Although the Chinese leadership has apologized for previous injustices, and has pledged not to wage political campaigns against intellectuals, scholars feel vulnerable, knowing that their former tormentors are still around. Nonetheless, the personal risk is sufficiently outweighed by the perceived short-term rewards and long-term career opportunities to produce a tidal wave of applications to study abroad.

The ambivalence among the older generation toward Western training cannot be attributed solely to the recent suffering. Deeper issues of pride and the burden of China's cultural heritage matter. Many in the younger generation who rush eagerly to Western universities no longer act on traditional values. Others seem unaware of the tensions between Chinese and Western cultures, or are confident they can emerge relatively unscathed from a protracted exposure to the West. The older generation is more concerned that Chinese scholars may risk their Chineseness by becoming cosmopolitan intellectuals.

Many of the virtues of the traditional, cultured Chinese scholar-bureaucrat—propriety, loyalty to those to whom one owes obligations, benevolence, harmony, the art of yielding, comfort in hierarchy, moderation, reason—apparently remain esteemed values throughout much of the society. While these virtues are no longer publically acclaimed, one senses that scholars who earn the respect of their colleagues in China today exhibit these traditional traits. The generation with previous Western experience understands that Western humanistic and social science traditions are based on individualism, empiricism, competition, and freedom. These Western values can only coexist in uneasy tension for the Chinese scholar who wishes to reproduce and extend his own cultural heritage while embracing the West. Such a scholar must reconcile individualism and loyalty, empiricism and propriety, competition and harmony, freedom and hierarchy. Sensitive intel-

lectuals in China know the doubts as well as the exhilaration of bridging two cultures; the opportunity both attracts and frightens.

There is a third reason for the ambivalence toward Western contact. Chinese academics are determined to be involved in the discovery of their own society. They express concern that if they do not participate in the initial definition of a research problem and in the development of the project, they will find themselves reading interpretations of Chinese society written largely by "outsiders"; outsiders who have never shown a serious scholarly understanding of Marxism–Leninism. Consequently, the Chinese want to establish research priorities, want to organize data collection, want to be sure that analyses of their society do not offend their own citizens.

American recollections

While the Chinese are keenly aware of the historical record in Sino–American scholarly relations, ahistorical Americans are less informed about their own pre-1949 experience with China, recounted in several scholarly monographs tracing the history of the YMCA, Yale-in-China, Peking Union Medical College, Harvard–Yenching, the missionary effort, the Christian colleges, and the scientific research institutes. These studies examine fundamental policy dilemmas in earlier American–Chinese interaction, anticipating aspects of the current exchange relationship.

The themes of past experiences which seem applicable today include the underestimation of fiscal costs, the inability of both sides to formulate realistic policies, the misunderstanding of the political situation, the Chinese penchant to emulate models, the repeated failure of Americans to define their purposes, the use of China by Americans to solve personal needs, and the frequent indecision over the balance to be struck between center and periphery, elite and mass, and cosmopolitan and indigenous values.

Budgets of American organizations in China typically un-

derestimated actual expenditures. Chinese “squeeze” and feigned disbelief that the American funds had limits were the principal factors. Before 1949, the Chinese exhibited extraordinary talent in penetrating an organization and in turning temporary aid into permanent dependency, with the patron feeling immoral if the relationship were terminated. Inevitably, Americans were pressed to the limit, and the task became to sustain in human terms the obligations already incurred. Programs were hard to modify once launched.

Some of the difficulties can be traced to how the American academic and foundation worlds formulated policy toward China in the 1920s. Policy was based on a combination of reports from officers stationed in China and from periodic, relatively short visits of special commissions to China. Reports by the permanent representatives typically fluctuated between euphoric assessments following new Chinese commitments and despairing, frustrated assessments growing out of the daily, wearying clashes with Chinese officials. It was the rare American officer on the scene who was able to maintain a steady, visionary course while enmeshed in the various upheavals of modern Chinese history.

Information gleaned from investigative trips was equally misleading. American delegations often thought their organizations were making more progress than was actually the case. One reason was the highly cultivated Chinese sense of courtesy. Often, to be polite, Chinese were noncommittal in ways that were in fact intended to communicate disagreement or skepticism. Not understanding that Chinese politeness dictated avoidance of open disagreement, Americans erroneously thought they had elicited concurrence. Subsequent failure of the Chinese to deliver led to a sense of betrayal or duplicity. Chinese hospitality to visiting delegations was also mistaken as an indication of Chinese policy. Caught in the excitement of the moment, American delegations repeatedly pledged support without the resources at hand. Or, overreacting to a temporary setback, the vis-

isting commissions failed to discern the real opportunities that were available.

The Chinese habit of emulating models has also led to cross-cultural misunderstandings. Instead of seeking to comprehend the deeper principles associated with a technique or a social practice, Chinese tended simply to copy the model. This was exhibited in the 1950s, when the Chinese uncritically copied the Soviet model for building socialism. When the Chinese experienced problems with the Soviet model in such areas as law, industrial management, and military organization, they tended to attribute their difficulties to inadequacies of the model rather than to inadequacies in implementation or to the incompatibilities between the Soviet model and Chinese culture. The complexities of selective cross-cultural borrowing seem repeatedly to have been underestimated by both the Chinese "borrowers" and the foreign "donors."

A review of pre-1949 experience in academic exchanges brings one additional lesson to our attention. Americans often lacked a clear concept of why they were in China or why they were inviting Chinese students to the United States. Diffuse sentiment—the desire to do good works—without a well-defined sense of purpose usually motivated the effort. Or some Americans were in China simply because they wished not to be in the United States. The successful academic ventures—and many did occur—were ones that had discernible, limited objectives which served American as well as Chinese interests and which required meaningful efforts by the Chinese in exchange for American assistance.

The greatest successes came with constancy of purpose. Certain choices had to be made in establishing academic programs with Chinese. Was the program to center on the Western enclaves of Shanghai or Tianjin and the political centers of Beijing and Nanjing? Or was an effort to be made to reach out, to locate in or recruit from the peripheral areas of the interior: Hunan, Sichuan, and so on? Was the focus on training an elite, whose burden it would then be to reach

out? Or should the program have a popular component? To what extent was the training to bring Chinese scholarship to internationally accepted standards? To what extent was the purpose to nurture indigenous ideas? These are well-known dilemmas.

The pre-1949 experience in China points to an important general lesson. It mattered little, in terms of the success of the program, whether the program favored the cosmopolitan or the provincial, the elite or the mass, the center or the periphery. What counted was the existence of a clear-cut policy on these fundamental issues. In a sense, the YMCA and Peking Union Medical College adopted quite different strategies, but both were successes because they addressed these issues forthrightly. Difficulties were predictable, even acceptable, because they were the logical consequence of conscious choice. The programs that failed were those which did not choose, but sought to serve all.

THE CONTEMPORARY ACADEMIC CONTEXT

The structure of Chinese universities and research institutes is generally rigid, hierarchical, inbred, compartmentalized, and segmented. These structural characteristics are visible in the regulations which govern access to libraries and archives and in the confidential or secret classification of statistics, reports, and texts often essential for scholarly research. The rigidity and hierarchy are visible in the consciousness of rank among Chinese academics. The compartmentalization is revealed in the difficulty Chinese encounter in visiting a unit to which they do not belong. Physically and psychologically, walls encircle all academic institutions, and exit and entry through the limited number of gates is carefully controlled. The compartmentalization is intensified through residential, social, and political arrangements. The place of work—where one teaches or does research—provides living arrangements in unit-controlled apartment buildings, and political life is organized on the basis of the same work-residential units. Within universi-

ties, individual departments have set curricula for their majors. Departments offer few service courses for majors in other departments. Students in a department stay together, progressing through a fairly set curriculum, only occasionally taking a course by a faculty member from another department. Research institutes in the national academies are generally independent, although some institutes in the Academy of Social Sciences, such as those of industrial management and economics, do cooperate closely.

Hierarchy and discipline exist throughout the budgeting, task assignment, and appointment processes. Key appointments are controlled at higher levels. The Party penetrates all universities and research institutes, and Party secretary appointments are made by the Party's Organization Department. All funds come from the government. The Academy of Social Sciences, the Academy of Science, and the centrally directed universities are on the national government's budget lines.

Government organs can assign projects to research institutes and can direct university departments to adopt curricula appropriate for the large number of students being trained for ministerial positions. We do not know how much bargaining is involved in task assignment, budgeting, and personnel policy. It is possible that control is less strict than it appears. But academic autonomy of the kind taken for granted in the United States is largely absent in China. There the academic community swiftly reflects changes in the political mood.

Notwithstanding their political permeability, Chinese academic institutions remain inbred. This stems from recruitment, publication, and promotion patterns. At the older, better universities, faculty tend to be recruited from the best of their previous students. (This pattern is less true at provincial or newer universities.) Moreover, because graduate work typically has entailed an apprenticeship—a student working with one master professor—a department frequently consists of a few doyens and their disciples. Journals tend to reinforce the parochialism. With the exception of a few na-

tional journals such as *Lishi Yanjiu* ("Historical Research"), which draw from a nationwide profession, scholars tend to publish in the journal of their unit. Articles apparently are not typically circulated for peer review outside the unit. Promotion is largely a matter of seniority. The "iron rice bowl" extends to the younger scholars who, once brought into an academic unit, are likely to remain there for life. Incompetence does not lead to dismissal; competence does not produce rapid promotion.

Formal, horizontal channels of communication between people of equal rank in separate organizations are not well developed. Rather, the tendency is to follow vertical channels until the lines of authority intersect. For example, if the Nanjing History Department and the Fudan History Department wished to convene a jointly-funded conference, the conference would not be planned at the departmental level without authorization from the two universities and their supervisory agencies—ultimately the Bureau of Higher Education of the Ministry of Education. These bureaucratic arrangements give an unusual importance to networks of persons linked through various common bonds—shared revolutionary experiences, school ties, similar foreign training, family connections, same geographical origin, or presence in the same organization at some point in the past (such as being in the same May 7th School during the Cultural Revolution).

Sociologically, it seems appropriate to speak of China, including its academic community, as a cellular society composed of units which seek to be as self-contained as possible. In the Maoist era, this enhanced the ability of a unit to survive the unpredictability of the political-administrative system. Imperfectly integrating the various academic units are the Communist Party, the propaganda system, the budgetary and planning process, the quiet but pervasive presence of the public security forces and the military, and the network of personal ties which academics utilize to counter the intrusiveness of the other integrative mechanisms. Tensions within each cell remain high. Personal

animosities accumulate; in the absence of geographical mobility, malcontents remain in the unit. Memories of previous injustices and of lost battles are stored, to be used when the opportunity presents itself. The volatile quality of Chinese politics becomes understandable. Unchecked factional strife in the Politburo soon echoes throughout the country, as people in local units seek to make use of the instability at the center and of the weakening of the integrative mechanisms to even personal scores in their own unit.

Another crucial aspect of academic life is its lack of generally shared socialization experiences. On the contrary, the academic community is marked by distinct generational layers. Those trained before 1950 either studied in the United States, Japan, or Western Europe (no universities granted Ph.D.s in China before 1949) or received their training in the Western-oriented universities of China. Many in this group have personal ties with top economic and educational bureaucrats in the post-Mao leadership, for they participated together in the anti-Japanese and anti-Kuomintang student movements of the 1930s and 1940s. This group is joined by a few dozen Chinese intellectuals who returned from abroad during the 1950s and early 1960s.

Next come the social scientists and humanists who embarked on their careers in the 1950s. Many were trained in the Soviet Union. Now in their 50s, their first foreign language is Russian and the only academic system with which they have had extensive experience is the Soviet one. With the rupture in Sino-Soviet relations, an indigenously-trained generation emerged in the 1959–66 period—competent people, products of a systematic, Russian-oriented system, but without foreign exposure. This group is in their 40s.

Then come faculty and researchers in their 20s and 30s: the Cultural Revolution or “lost” generation. It is hardly a cohesive generation, for while some became Red Guard activists and then junior faculty because of their political orientation, others stayed home and were tutored by rela-

tives or family friends. The latter, technically proficient, entered academic units in the 1970s while many of the former—still on university and research institute payrolls—are under orders to remain idle, away from their units. One suspects that some of the Cultural Revolutionaries had or still have personal ties with like-minded Party officials who are also under a cloud. (Twenty of the currently 38-million member Communist Party were recruited during the Cultural Revolution.) Yet others in their 20s and 30s, after a period in the countryside and without adequate secondary school training, were admitted to universities in the 1970s. We are about to see a new generation emerge with the university graduating class of 1981: an age cohort whose university education has not been disrupted by political turmoil or campaigns and who were selected through performance on examinations.

The sketch we have drawn—the generational layering of the Chinese academic community, its cellular nature, the repeated, divisive campaigns which the regime has waged against academics over the past 30 years—stresses one point above all as we consider how to establish American relations with China's humanists and social scientists. Chinese scholars are a much bullied, fragmented, and weary group. They remain patriotic and willing to serve their country, but for the most part they wish to do so while minimizing personal risk. They also hope to enhance the prospects for a peaceful, more secure future for their families, particularly because in many instances their academic affiliations brought suffering to their families.

The scars of the Cultural Revolution years have not yet healed; China still is a wounded society. It is likely to be many years under the best of circumstances before most disciplines attain the necessary level of national coherence and trust to sustain genuine intellectual interchange. Any institution with which Americans deal is likely to be faction-ridden, with each faction linked to a different external network of personal ties. Frequently, what appears to Americans as an agreement with a Chinese institution is

viewed by Chinese as an agreement with a faction within the institution, crafted and implemented to benefit that faction.

To this analysis of the contemporary academic context in China must be added our previous comments about the task of scholarship. We have said that scholarship in China has before it an awesome set of tasks. At one level is the challenge to comprehend and articulate the Chinese path to socialist modernization. At another level is the job of designing and evaluating specific policies appropriate to the current modernization drive. The first task is somewhat analogous to the "founding period" in United States political history, when a group of intellectuals were challenged to think through the deeper theory of governance and economic development which became expressed in the political theory of the Constitution. The second task is somewhat analogous to the efforts of social science in the 1930s and again in the 1960s and 1970s to become "policy sciences" for government's efforts to deal with economic and social development. Either task is difficult by itself; joining them is a high-risk venture. And powerful political interests in China are closely watching how intellectuals will conceptualize "the Chinese path to modernization" as well as how well their recommended policies are working. Especially visible are the Chinese scholars with whom the exchange program is being negotiated. Political vulnerability, then, is a deep and continuing part of the life of social scientists and humanists in China.

We have presented these historical and sociological observations about Chinese intellectual life, especially as organized through the humanities and social sciences, to provide a perspective on the context within which an exchange program in general and an American research presence more specifically will develop, or fail to develop. Lack of attention to the Chinese context by American planners and scholars greatly increases the chance of failure. □

Prospects for an American Research Presence

5

What are the prospects for protecting and expanding research opportunities for American scholars in China? The initial years of the exchange program have involved sustained effort to place qualified scholars in Chinese villages, to secure access to economic and statistical data, to open up archives and library holdings, to visit archeological sites; in short, to arrange those opportunities which will further our humanistic and social science understanding of China. Not all efforts have been equally successful, and even the successful programs remain fragile. The Commission, therefore, places high priority on consolidating past accomplishments and expanding an American research presence. This priority follows directly from the objectives earlier endorsed. It is time now to assess the prospects and problems.

The immediate prospects for research in literature, history, philosophy, and linguistics are promising. Gradually, historical archives are being opened up. Americans have begun to use four major archives: the Palace Archives in Beijing, those of the Ming–Qing in Nanjing, the Taiping in Nanjing, and the 1911 Revolution in Wuhan. Policy on

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access to other important archives (as in Shanghai) or to county historical archives is unclear, but efforts to do research have been largely unsuccessful to date. Slow progress is being made in improving reproduction facilities. Scholars generally have access to Chinese artists and writers, although access to museum collections is not readily provided. A number of American historians and specialists in Chinese literature have had successful research experiences, and these scholars have begun to develop collegial relations.

Less encouraging is the Commission's realization that little progress can be expected in declassifying documents and statistical data. A significant portion of all publications in China—past and present—is classified as *neibu* (internal). Some *neibu* publications do pertain to national security interests, but others—such as 19th century maps or draft conference papers on, say, Qing history—acquired the *neibu* label for arcane reasons stemming from traditional Chinese practices in handling information. Political scientists and economists particularly are frustrated by the lack of access to good and seemingly innocuous statistical compilations and documentary collections. There is no routine declassification system. Another vexing aspect of documentary research in China is the lack of stack access (resulting from the large volume of *neibu* materials in the stacks) and the inadequate catalogs of library holdings. The Commission expects slow progress, at best, in this area.

The Commission was most disturbed by prospects for field research. Chinese officials frequently cautioned the Commission not to raise false hopes about opportunities to conduct research which entails sustained observation of Chinese in their natural social settings—villages, factories, and neighborhoods. Nor are social surveys using scientific sampling and interviewing methodologies likely to be welcomed. Although several anthropologists, political scientists, and sociologists successfully carried out village studies in 1977–1980, such studies are unlikely to be approved swiftly during the next few years. It is unclear whether a

few exceptions will be made or whether special local arrangements can be made. It is also unclear whether there will be improvement after the present period of limited access. This retrogression mars an otherwise more positive, although guarded, picture of the gradual establishment of research access for American scholars.

SIX CHINESE CRITERIA DETERMINING RESEARCH ACCESS

In considering American research opportunities, the Commission found it useful to identify the criteria which appear to determine whether a particular research project will be welcomed in China. These criteria help explain research access for any scholars, whether they want documents from archives, newspapers from libraries, data from the statistical bureaus, interviews with bureaucrats, or the chance to live in a village. We believe the Chinese will continue to apply these criteria into the indefinite future.¹

(1) *Conformity to Chinese bureaucratic and scholarly practice.* Does the research conform to Chinese bureaucratic practices? Is the study one which Chinese scholars themselves would be permitted to undertake? If the answer is "No" to either question, the research is not likely to be permitted and assisted.

There is, of course, a familiar element in this observation. A portion of the research effort in any society must be devoted to mastering the bureaucratic processes which influence research opportunities. China is no exception. Many researchers are finding that anywhere from a few

¹ Although academic leaders in both countries have reiterated that the normalization of scholarly relations should be sustained irrespective of variations in the political climate, most believe deterioration in political relations would lead to increased restrictions on American scholars in China. If in this report we do not spend much time on the interaction between the political climate and research opportunities it is not because we take the issue lightly. Research designs can take into account the effect of these six factors; they cannot be predicated on assumptions about fluctuations in the state of political relations between the two governments.

months to a year must be invested in learning the system before serious research is possible. And if the investigation is on a topic closed to Chinese scholars, some Chinese officials may fear setting a precedent internally and some Chinese scholars may sabotage the effort so that a foreigner will not study what the Chinese want to reserve for studying themselves. (Other Chinese bureaucrats and scholars, however, may cheer the foreigner on, hoping that new trails are being blazed for all.)

The issue in China goes further than this familiar problem. The Chinese bureaucracy is an ancient institution, today omnipresent, and resistant to accommodating unusual or out-of-the-ordinary demands. A foreign research presence is as out-of-the-ordinary today as it has been for centuries. Foreign research practices which cannot easily be accommodated by standard operating procedures take an extraordinary effort by some friend in court if they are to be accepted. Those Chinese who have sought to facilitate research bear a heavy bureaucratic burden and are finding these extraordinary efforts to be increasingly onerous. As China goes through its present economic readjustment programs—which are straining an already stretched bureaucracy—resistance to making arrangements for foreign scholars is increasing. To date, high level officials in the central government have provided no firm instructions to reduce bureaucratic impediments.

(2) *Isolation from social processes.* To what extent can the research be conducted in isolation from the daily lives of the Chinese people, whether villagers or city bureaucrats? The less intrusive the research, as defined by the Chinese, the greater the likelihood that it will be allowed. This condition, carried to an extreme, would obviously disallow any research that involved talking with or even observing Chinese people. Such an extreme view is not held. But it is evident that the Chinese government seems more comfortable with a foreign research presence that minimizes contact between the foreign scholar and the Chinese people. No doubt, different officials support this position for different reasons.

Some exhibit a bureaucratic or an ideological or a traditional cultural passion for secrecy. Some are embarrassed by the inadequate or primitive facilities China has to offer, and fear that the foreigner will belittle them. Others harbor a deep suspicion of the motives of those wishing to observe or “peer at” China. Others fear ideological contamination through prolonged personal contact with foreigners. Still others lack interest in any form of exchange that does not have, or seem to have, an immediate and visible payoff, particularly because foreign research frequently is costly in terms of manpower and material. Along similar lines is the concern that a prolonged foreign research presence in a local community would disrupt social order and production. Still others fear they will be held accountable if the research does not go well. And some others have genuine concern with the health and safety of the foreign guest and are unwilling to assume the responsibility which might come with illness or popular expression of antiforeign sentiment. There is no single explanation for officialdom’s reluctance to permit direct, sustained research in the living society. But this recitation of the various reasons which different Chinese officials have offered reveals how deep the reluctance is. (The Commission was unable to discern whether ordinary people are equally hesitant.)

(3) *Availability of Chinese colleagues.* Is the research being conducted in a discipline where there are established Chinese colleagues? Academic leaders in China appear to have decided that a foreign research presence is most welcome in those disciplines—such as history or linguistics—where there is depth and strength in Chinese scholarship, and least welcome in those disciplines—such as anthropology and sociology—where the rebuilding is just beginning. There are several reasons why having Chinese counterparts in a field of study makes research in that discipline much more feasible. Experience has shown that one gains the easiest access to data through the good offices of a Chinese colleague who is already familiar with the research terrain. A fellow scholar is more likely to understand and be able to

explain why a given research project is important enough to warrant making troublesome special arrangements. Also, as long as their own scholars are not conducting research in a particular field, the Chinese are bound to feel manipulated when asked to arrange research opportunities for a foreign scholar to collect data which they themselves lack the personnel to analyze. Pride also enters in. The Chinese wish to cultivate their own disciplines, and they are reluctant to invite foreigners to write the pioneering studies. Finally, the Chinese claim—and, presumably, believe—that foreign researchers cannot achieve accurate, meaningful research results without active involvement by Chinese scholars. It follows that foreign researchers in those disciplines with few trained Chinese colleagues cannot conduct quality research in China. Why, then, should the Chinese accommodate research which, by their logic, is going to be of poor quality? Why should Americans even want to do such research?

(4) *Usefulness to China.* Are the research results or methodologies likely to be—or at least thought by the Chinese likely to be—helpful in China's current development programs? Research which serves American disciplinary goals alone is less likely to be welcomed than research which serves Chinese development goals. This is a natural corollary to the insistence that Chinese research efforts be organized in terms of specific social objectives and programs. The Chinese ask, if research is not helpful to China, why should the Chinese people be helpful to the researcher?

(5) *National security considerations.* Does the research encroach, or appear to encroach, on national security issues? No nation allows foreign researchers to conduct studies which might have national security implications. The commitment of the United States to international scientific cooperation and full sharing of research results does not extend to those areas of science and technology that might negatively affect our military strength or national security; in some instances, commercial competition is taken into account as well. The Chinese, just now emerging from a

long period of deep suspicion toward outside powers, are no less sensitive to security issues. Indeed, they take a quite conservative and restrictive view in defining sensitivity. Large areas of the country, to say nothing of numerous topics and data sources, are off limits to foreign investigators. Related to this security sensitivity is another consideration affecting research opportunities. Research which is more easily monitored for possible security implications, or violations, is more acceptable than research which would be bureaucratically costly to monitor.

(6) *Reputation of the scholar.* The Chinese are more prepared to accommodate scholars whom they know and trust than those who are unknown to them. This does not mean that the foreign scholar has to be politically acceptable to the Chinese government. Rather, issues of reliability, credibility, visibility, and productivity seem to be primarily at stake. If the Chinese are going to put forth the effort to host a foreign scholar, at a minimum they seek accurate, fair writing that they hope will attract attention. Moreover, they realize that influential scholars can be helpful to them. All these considerations mean that without outside assistance, younger and less well known scholars will not enjoy as easy access as more established scholars.

These six factors do not affect all disciplines equally. They promote some disciplines and hamper others. For instance, they promote the research of a historian who has a clear sense of the documents wanted, and hamper the research of an anthropologist who wants to live in an isolated village through the planting-and-harvesting cycle. Moreover, they favor those parts of the social science and humanities disciplines which have been particularly interested in development issues, such as demography, development economics, or rural sociology, since these disciplinary specialities are more likely to be thought of as compatible with China's own modernization aims.

The set of six interrelated factors, in the judgment of the Commission, accounts for many of the successes and fail-

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ures thus far experienced in establishing research access in China. We believe the criteria will continue to operate for some time. After all, restraints are present in almost every foreign research context, and we should not be surprised to find them in China. Moreover, at least from the perspective of the Chinese bureaucracy, these are reasonable constraints.

RESPONDING TO RESTRICTIONS ON AN AMERICAN RESEARCH PRESENCE

Because the entire range of the humanistic and social science disciplines as practiced in the United States constitutes a loosely integrated intellectual system, with each discipline drawing upon intellectual developments elsewhere in the system, any scholarly exchange program which selectively benefits particular disciplines, or parts of disciplines, does damage to all. It follows that the exchange program should promote access to China for the entire scholarly system. Anything less is not in the interests of American scholarship, not in the interests of the exchange relationship, and, from our perspective, not in the interests of scholarly developments in China. In the Commission's view, the direction of China scholarship in this country and the incorporation of the China case more generally into the humanities and social sciences should proceed in standard scholarly fashion, that is, in response to research findings which set in motion new research inquiries which lead to revised findings. The selective effects of the current constraints will introduce serious distortions into the pattern of research findings and reports which emerge from scholarly exchanges.

In short, the Commission finds that the six Chinese criteria affecting research access provide a limiting framework upon which to build a mutually beneficial, enduring exchange of ideas and scholars. From an American perspective, the most important criterion for evaluating a research proposal—its intellectual merit in advancing a rigorous

comprehension of China and in advancing a disciplined theory—is missing. We strongly urge that all practical measures be taken, at this early but critical stage of United States–China scholarly relations, to establish a balanced research presence in China, a presence in which topics and researchers are selected on the basis of standard scholarly criteria.

Such a presence entails responsibilities as well. Not only should our scholars be excellent in their discipline and knowledgeable about China, with sufficient fluency in the language where called for, but they must have some acquaintance with contemporary Chinese bureaucratic practice. They must be mentally prepared for the rigors of research in China. They should receive thorough orientation briefings before departure, so that their expectations can be realistic. They should be sensitive to various ethical and cultural issues of doing research in China. A few examples highlight this important precaution:

- One cannot be sure that one's Chinese colleagues or informants will escape political harm if the authorities do not like the results of the research. In that particular context, in what ways can the results of social research be accurately reported so as to minimize the disruptions to the community one studied? How can research projects take this problem into account from the outset?
- If a researcher gains access to *neibu* materials which do not contain national security information (such as a paper on the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion), how can such materials be appropriately handled?
- Given the great efforts to which many Chinese go to facilitate research, how can one demonstrate one's gratitude?
- Friendship is not swiftly extended in Chinese culture, but when it is, the expectations are high that the bonds will prove enduring, with mutual obligations entailed. How can friendships be fostered which keep expectations of reciprocal obligations at realistic levels?

To seek a research presence in China means that some effort must be made to ensure that our researchers are aware of such issues. While the initial experience in this

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area has been satisfactory to both sides, some needed lessons have been learned. Given the 20-year rupture in relations, some initial problems were perhaps predictable, and obviously there is no way to ensure perfect conduct. Americans have now acquired a clearer sense of how to conduct themselves while engaged in research, and it is important that this awareness be conveyed to a larger community. The Commission believes that the national organizations and universities engaged in scholarly exchanges should clarify the basic rules to which they expect scholars to adhere while studying in China.

Accommodation or confrontation?

A gap exists between what the Commission believes an appropriate research presence in China should be and what the Chinese currently are willing and able to permit. How should the American academic community respond? Should we simply acquiesce and accommodate our research to Chinese restrictions? Or should we retaliate and urge confrontation? The Commission heard Americans advocate both accommodation and sharp confrontation. Advocates of accommodation stress the need to respect Chinese national sovereignty, are satisfied with progress to date, believe the Chinese are making good-faith efforts, and/or view research as but part of the purpose of a stay in China. According to this view, immersion in the culture to acquire a “feel” for the richness and complexity of China is what is important, and there is ample opportunity for such experiences.

Advocates of confrontation believe the way to make progress with the Chinese is to threaten retaliation. To do otherwise is to institutionalize arrangements which may permanently foreclose research opportunities for certain scholars, disciplines, and methodologies. Focusing on the openness of the United States to Chinese scholars and the funding available to Chinese to study in the United States, proponents of this view strongly resent what they perceive

as the imbalance or inequality of the current exchange programs.

The Commission believes that accommodation is a mistake. The scope of present constraints, especially on social research, means that unless restrictions are gradually modified, the United States has little prospect of achieving a level of understanding of China that would warrant significant expenditure of scarce funds for scholarly exchanges in the humanities and social sciences. Without the promise of gradually improving access, American academics will conclude they can more effectively enhance their knowledge and appreciation of other intellectually challenging societies—where the promise of local cooperation is greater.

Accommodation to current constraints is unwarranted for other reasons. The Chinese are now groping for the best way to respond to foreign requests to do research in China. This is a new situation for the officials involved, and the Commission feels that through a sustained dialogue more satisfactory arrangements can be made. Moreover, it is not at all clear that all Chinese scholars are happy with the current constraints on their scholarship. For American or other foreign scholars to accept current restrictive practices could adversely affect both Chinese and foreign efforts to achieve greater research opportunities.

At the same time, the Commission believes that confrontation is not the appropriate way to encourage an evolution in Chinese practice. Like the United States, China has the right to determine the conditions under which foreigners will be accorded the privilege of doing research in China. A posture of confrontation would not reflect the very real progress that has been made and the substantial efforts that have been exerted on both sides in establishing viable exchanges in the humanities and social sciences. Further, the American purpose is certainly not to gather a maximum amount of data in the short run—running roughshod over the Chinese in the process. Hopefully, Americans doing research in China are not doing so for the only time in their

careers, but for the first of many times. Our goal is cultivating long-term scholarly exchanges. Retaliation and the removal of constraints through confrontation will not contribute to that end.

The Commission considered, and rejected, several specific retaliatory measures. One such idea, proposed by some Americans in testimony before the United States Congress and in newspaper commentary, advocates linking our training of Chinese in American universities with the provision of American research opportunities in China. A practical difficulty of such a policy is that the humanities and the social sciences in the United States do not control what it is that the Chinese want from the exchange program—scientific and technical training in American universities. More importantly, while it has and will remain beneficial to maintain a balance in the exchanges among the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences, it should be recognized that the United States is opening its science and technology to the Chinese mainly for reasons other than access for humanistic and social science scholars. Also involved are strategic national interests, the opportunity to train the next generation of technologists in China, and the recognition that many problems transcend national boundaries and require an international community of scientists for their solution.

There are other reasons for hesitancy about a national policy of retaliation. There are, after all, a number of Chinese humanists and social scientists in the United States at the present time. The training of these students and scholars has intellectual value for all who are concerned about the long-term possibilities for humanistic and social science research in China. In particular, the graduate students now enrolling in American universities in the humanities and the social sciences will begin to teach and conduct research in Chinese universities and academies. This will in all likelihood greatly increase the opportunities for collaborative work in those disciplines—such as archeology, art history, history, and literature—which already

enjoy it in some measure, and will initiate it in those disciplines—such as anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology—where it is now missing. It will also produce in China a cohort more likely to listen with an understanding ear to arguments about the importance of nonrestrictive research access.

The recommended response. Having rejected both accommodation and confrontation as proper responses to the situation, what alternatives do we offer? The Commission recommends that through all channels—the government, foundations, universities, and private individuals—Americans patiently but persistently inform the Chinese of our reactions, positive and negative, to their current policies. For, just as the United States is prepared to accept the Chinese definition of its needs in the disciplinary mix of scholars Beijing sends to the United States, we believe the Chinese should be prepared to respect our view of our scholarly needs in the disciplinary mix of scholars we wish to send to China. A relationship based on equality and mutual respect would seem to demand no less.

In particular, the Commission believes it important for the Chinese to understand clearly the consequences of the constraints they are imposing on research in China. We stress this measure because the Commission members discerned that the Chinese have not yet fully understood these three consequences:

(1) Placing limits on the American research presence in China invites the misperceptions of Chinese society which both sides so eagerly wish corrected. Vice Premier Bo Yibo, speaking to the Commission, took note that since normalization an earlier incorrect and incomplete knowledge of China by Americans is now being corrected and completed. “Chinese society [American scholars are now discovering] is not so simple as was previously thought. There is the fundamental question, for example, as to how China was conquered so many times and yet somehow managed to survive as a nation over the millenia. How after all did China develop as a society? It is necessary to understand

that in order to understand China today. To answer that question we should depend upon scholars of both countries, for this is a task which the epoch has given us to share."

The vice premier also expressed the view that scholarly research often influences other aspects of society. Accordingly, incomplete or unbalanced scholarship—for example, research conducted only in cities and never in rural China or interpretations based on refugee reports rather than on firsthand experience in China—is an inadequate basis on which to construct effective commercial, cultural, diplomatic, and security agreements. If for the past 30 years it was not in our mutual interest to restrict severely the scholarly presence of Western researchers in China, even less is it in our mutual interest to do so now that a wide range of contacts is being pursued.

(2) The Chinese have failed to appreciate the important sustaining role played by China scholars on American campuses, in the government, and on the committees raising funds for the exchange program. Many persons in the United States other than China scholars are eager for scholarly relations in the humanities and the social sciences, and no doubt programs would continue even if—as is currently unlikely—there is serious disaffection among China scholars. But to the extent China scholars are themselves prevented from conducting research or sending their students to China, their enthusiasm inevitably will be affected. This in turn will affect the intellectual climate within which Sino-American relations are conducted. American universities and foundations have many claims on their shrinking resources. China's comparatively high priority on the list of claims is not unrelated to the activism of China scholars. Any diminution of this involvement will have some negative effects, not immediately apparent but in the long run noticeable and detrimental to the exchange program.

(3) The Chinese have expressed high levels of interest in American social science and humanities practices. These practices are best—and perhaps really only—learned by

participation in actual research. It is the process which must be learned, what in the laboratory is called “hands-on” experience. So-called “Western research” is not only a set of results or techniques; it is also an intellectual attitude toward facts and theories. An attitude cannot be acquired through lectures alone, at least not very successfully; only through sharing the practice can new attitudes become ingrained. Perhaps unwittingly, the Chinese are rejecting this view which is at the heart of how American scholars go about training themselves and their students. The Commission believes the potential costs to be great.

The costs, along with others which could be listed, should be explained to the Chinese by all persons involved in building the scholarly exchange program—by lecturers and researchers in China, by university presidents signing agreements with Chinese universities, by foundation officers providing grants to Chinese institutions and individuals, by teachers on American campuses who have visiting scholars and students from China. And they should be explained in various settings—workshops, conferences, negotiating delegations, informal conversations, letters to colleagues. To fail to explain to the Chinese our perception of the full costs and implications of restrictive policies would be irresponsible.

In addition to seeking to convince the Chinese of the wisdom of gradually expanding an American research presence in China, the Commission strongly recommends that the American government, foundations, and universities retain this goal firmly in mind when negotiating exchange agreements with Chinese institutions. These agreements should be specific, with the commitments which each side has undertaken clearly spelled out. Recent studies by Peggy Blumenthal and Ralph Clough¹ underscore the necessity for

¹ See Peggy Blumenthal, *American Study Programs in China: An Interim Report Card* (Washington, D.C.: National Association for Foreign Student Affairs, 1981); see also Ralph N. Clough, *A Review of the U.S.-China Exchange Program* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Research, U.S. International Communication Agency, 1981).

precision in bilateral arrangements; frequently, unwarranted expectations have been raised in vague agreements of intent. In the course of developing an exchange program, foundations, universities, and government should seek to create research opportunities for Americans as part of the agreement. It is not unfriendly to bargain hard; it would be far worse not to bargain hard and harbor ill feelings a year or two later if the exchange seems inequitable.

The committees particularly responsible for guiding exchanges—the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China and the Joint Committee on Chinese Studies, sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council—should constantly monitor the overall exchange program and chart its progress. We do not expect rapid progress. But it is fair, at a minimum, to expect no retrogression and to hope for some gradual expansion. In the coming few years, if no new archives open up or if some of the present ones close, if the flow of statistics remains only a trickle, and if there is no firm indication that social research opportunities will gradually expand from the 1979–80 level, then clearly the patient approach which the Commission has recommended will not have succeeded. But given the strides of the past three years, it would be premature to lose patience and to abandon the longer vision that guides our approach.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the restrictions on an American research presence underscore that research in China should not be equated with research about China, although the two are obviously related. Nonetheless, the entire weight of this report suggests that many crucial topics for understanding current China cannot be easily or exclusively studied within China, e.g., Chinese national security policy, human rights, or the roles of the Communist Party and the Army. In addition, certain aspects of China can be effectively studied, at least in part, in Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, or even in libraries in the United States and Western Europe. Examples include Sung intellectual and

economic history, the Republican period (1911–1949), Chinese foreign trade since 1971, or the treaty port system. Further, the recency of Sino–American relations means that access to China for research purposes cannot be taken for granted. As a result, the United States must retain an independent capacity to understand China and not become dependent on Chinese openness. Through the 1960s and 1970s, the United States developed a network of training and research institutions which sought to foster a scholarly understanding of China: a few comprehensive and several specialized centers at our universities; the language training program in Taiwan; the research facilities at the Universities Service Centre in Hong Kong; and the field development, conference, and fellowship programs sponsored by the committees of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council. While some shift in emphasis may now be appropriate, the Commission feels this basic structure is necessary and should remain. □

Management of the Exchange Program

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Scholars in both the United States and China are discussing whether there is need for greater centralized coordination of the scholarly exchange program. There are those who suggest that the program could be improved if there were more coordination among the various institutions and individuals involved and more conscious agreement about the national goals to be served. There are also those who claim that many institutions should be involved, each pursuing independent goals and purposes, on the assumption that overlapping and even conflicting programs can aggregate into a more viable program than one organized by a few central institutions.

The Commission believes that United States scholarly interests are better served by pluralism, both in the initiation of contacts from the United States and in the array of institutions with which we should cooperate in China. The present mixture of a few national programs, and numerous instances of institutionally initiated programs from the United States, provide multiple, if not always well-funded, opportunities to pursue the kinds of general objectives outlined in the preceding sections.

There is no call in this report for a supraorganization which would try to coordinate all that is happening; nor is there a recommendation for greatly enlarging those programs which are already centrally managed. Moreover, the Commission urges that American scholars and scholarly institutions continue to form multiple links with counterpart institutions in China. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences will obviously continue to be a major counterpart institution, but more effort should go into forming relationships with the longer-established provincial academies, such as the Jiangsu, Jilin, and Shanghai academies of the social sciences.

Especially important in pursuing multiple opportunities for American scholars are the university-to-university programs already established or in the process of becoming so. A review of research and training opportunities through such university-to-university agreements is provided in the already cited study by Ralph Clough. He concludes that while university ties are characterized by extraordinary variety, enthusiasm, and ingenuity, three critical problem areas remain: structural differences between the two university systems, ensuring reciprocity, and financing. These parallel the observations of the Commission.

For the social sciences and humanities, the problem of structural differences and the search for a measure of reciprocity are interrelated. An important purpose of most American university programs is access for American scholars, especially those in the social sciences and humanities, in return for receiving scores or even hundreds of Chinese scientists and engineers. However, Chinese universities, even the large ones, are far more limited in scope than our large university systems, and have no formal institutional ties either to research institutes under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences or to other archives and libraries.

Difficulties in crossing institutional lines account for some of the problems in providing quality programs for American social scientists and humanists within Chinese university

programs, but not for all. Many American universities have hopes of sending graduate students to their "sister" university for either language training or research work. Most Chinese universities do not, at the present time, have the capacity to provide quality training in the Chinese language for foreign students. A number of American graduate students, sent under reciprocal university agreements, have become disillusioned at the language instruction and have returned home. Courses in several disciplines are open to foreign students, but many American universities do not give credit for courses taken in Chinese universities. Good research work is possible, especially in the humanities, but careful placement negotiation and a high degree of language competency are required. These factors should be weighed against the desirable experience of living and working in a Chinese educational setting.

Financing university programs has been exceedingly difficult. Most federal agencies and foundations prefer to fund programs where national competition and a rigorous selection process are involved. Although some universities have secured limited funds from local foundations and an occasional corporation, most have absorbed the costs of developing university-to-university programs. As Clough notes, these costs have been considerable, and it is not clear whether universities will continue to be willing or able to sustain these programs.

From the Chinese perspective, direct ties between Chinese and American universities continue to be highly valued. Although universities participate in the Ministry of Education program which has sent thousands of scholars to the United States, they have little control over the nature of the official program. Under direct university-to-university programs, there is far more flexibility in setting up reciprocal programs which involve little or no expenditure of foreign currency by the Chinese. Further, university-to-university programs provide an important ongoing and personalized channel between Chinese and American university administrators and professors. This channel is ex-

ceedingly important in developing contacts through which Chinese scholars can be placed in departments and laboratories in American universities, and through which American scholars, especially those in the physical and engineering sciences, will be invited to lecture in Chinese universities. For the most part, however, the needs of social science and humanities departments of Chinese universities are not fully reflected in the university-to-university programs.

Despite these difficulties, the Commission recommends increasing emphasis on contact with Chinese universities. There are signs that it will be in the university setting that training and research will be combined, a model with which American scholars are most comfortable. This will be accelerated as the next generation of trained Chinese scholars, many of them now being prepared for graduate work in American humanities and social science departments, returns to China. This will be the generation, starting in the late 1980s, which will be critical for moving scholarly relations into the next phase.

If decentralization is to prevail, both in the U.S.-initiated programs and in the pattern of contacts within China, as the Commission believes it should, then many institutions will have to deal independently, although we hope not inconsistently, with such common issues as quality control, reciprocity, and research access for American scholars. The success of the overall exchange relationship, and the extent to which it enhances scholarly analysis of China, will increasingly depend on judgments exercised across the dozens and even hundreds of institutions presently or likely to become involved.

A division of responsibility. Decentralization, as a general policy, obviously makes more sense if there is a division of responsibility rather than a duplication of effort. A natural division of responsibilities is already emerging. For example:

- Individual university leadership in establishing contact with Chinese universities

- The nationally competitive advanced study and research program administered by the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China and the Board of Foreign Scholars-sponsored Fulbright program
- Focused foundation support for research and exchanges in particular disciplines (such as the National Science Foundation support of archeology and linguistics and the Ford Foundation support of economics, international relations, and law)
- Programs for bringing Chinese scholars to the United States (such as the Henry Luce Foundation fellowship funds to 17 universities and the faculty development program of the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia)
- Conferences and workshops sponsored by the Joint Committee on Chinese Studies

Particular institutions are providing, or are planning to provide, leadership for particular disciplines and disciplinary specialties. The economics liaison committee sponsored by the American Economic Association and the Social Science Research Council is actively planning a number of workshops and conferences in economics. The Rand Corporation has initiated discussions with the Chinese about a major program in policy analysis and the conduct of policy-relevant research. Psychologists at the University of Michigan have initiated a modest exchange and research program in child development, with funding from the Foundation for Child Development. Opportunities to work with the recently formed Linguistic Society of China are being explored. The University of Pittsburgh has initiated a program in sociology. Cooperation with the Chinese census has provided opportunities for demographers.

The Commission believes that this disciplinary-specific division of labor should be more self-consciously encouraged. Particular institutions, or even individual scholars, should be informally "assigned" responsibility for building relationships in specific disciplines and specialties. This "assignment" should not issue from some central coordinating agency, but should emerge from some shared understandings among persons actively involved in promoting scholarly relations in the humanities and social sci-

ences. It is, however, important that every discipline in the humanities and the social sciences benefit from a focused, sustained activity.

Sequenced development. There is one principle which the Commission would particularly bring to the attention of those who are planning discipline- or institution-specific exchange programs. The experience of the last few years has tested and found successful a sequence which starts with exploratory visits and lectures; proceeds next to seminars, jointly-planned workshops and symposia; and then concentrates on research opportunities for Americans. This is a natural sequence and one with which the Chinese are comfortable. In those disciplines where the sequence has been ignored, an American research presence has been difficult to secure. And where research has been nonetheless insisted upon, problems have invariably followed. In some instances, the problems have set back earlier advances, leaving a discipline further behind than it might be if a more cautious sequence had been established. Obviously each discipline or speciality area will have to sort out its sequence of program activities in light of available funding, Chinese counterpart scholars and organizations, the depth of Chinese expertise among Americans who practice the discipline, and so forth. But within these constraints, activities which establish relations with Chinese counterparts should precede efforts to conduct independent research.

The sequenced development we recommend should be deliberately designed to promote advanced research opportunities for American scholars. The Commission believes it is critically important that each discipline-specific program build toward opportunities for an American research presence. Only a sustained insistence that the interests of American research scholars be protected will realize the goals earlier endorsed in this report. Those who share these goals have the responsibility of seeing that their own activity advances them.

Although no single institution should presume to manage the necessary division of labor, there is need for frequent

consultation and sharing of information across the many institutions actively promoting exchange programs. There will be the need for “plenary sessions” from time to time, presenting the opportunities for natural coordination to emerge.

National programs. The discipline-by-discipline strategy should be complemented by a small number of nationally-managed programs. The Commission identified three candidates: (1) establishing a nationally competitive program for placing a small number of highly qualified senior researchers and doctoral candidates in China for periods long enough to allow sustained research; (2) establishing a Chinese language study center in China, and (3) systematically cooperating with the Chinese in establishing “American studies” in China.

The Commission was not assigned the authority, nor did it feel it had the necessary skills and information, to “design” these national programs. The first, of course, is presently being managed by the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China. It has been the subject of an extended review, the conclusions of which are strongly endorsed by the Commission.¹

The other two candidates for national program attention—a Chinese-language study center and a focused program of American studies in China—do not presently exist, and are not likely to emerge from the pluralism now characterizing the exchange program. The case for a Chinese-language study center is self-evident; without sus-

¹ The review, by Ralph Clough, concluded that “The federally-funded national program administered by the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China for sending American scholars and students to China is essential to enable a sizeable number of well-qualified Americans from a variety of institutions to go to China under acceptable conditions. It should continue to be funded at about the present level. Any serious reduction in funding would rob the United States of the ability to obtain the reciprocity it should have in access for American scholars to research opportunities in China in exchange for accepting the large number of Chinese scholars being supported in this country by the Chinese government.” See Clough, *op. cit.*

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taining and enlarging language competency, the various relations with China—commercial, political, and military as well as educational and cultural—will falter. The Taiwan center serves the American academic community, and should be protected in its own terms and against the possibility that the People's Republic might again become closed to an American presence. Taiwan, however, should not be the only home for Chinese language instruction. The interest of American students in studying on the mainland is sufficiently strong that they will settle for second-rate instruction in order to be in Beijing or Nanjing or Shanghai. Because the United States can ill afford a generation of scholars, diplomats, lawyers, and corporate officials with less than first-rate language training, it is of national importance that there be a language study center in the People's Republic. Such a center is unlikely to be established except under the sponsorship of an experienced national organization, which can secure funding, protect the center's scholarly purposes, negotiate appropriate arrangements with Chinese, and provide management skills.

The claim is equally strong for a focused program in American studies. That "American studies" will flourish in China is not doubted by any who have witnessed the seemingly inexhaustible appetite for things American, including the products of American cultural and intellectual life. This appetite is currently being fed with mediocre, incomplete, and often biased materials. For instance, historical and political materials on the United States available in China reflect the Soviet period, and frequently contain little more than Communist Party clichés, half-truths, and plain misinformation. Because the Commission believes it is of importance both to the Chinese and to ourselves that China's leaders, including its academic leaders, be able to make correct assessments about the United States, and especially of the role of ideas and research in our society, we endorse national level coordination of United States efforts to cooperate with the Chinese request for American studies materials and teachers.

We urge that American studies in China be broadly defined, as broadly as our scholars define Chinese studies. What we welcome is the establishment in China of scholarly studies of American life which involve all the social science and humanities disciplines. Language, literature, and history should be prominently represented. So also should studies by the Chinese of our political and economic thought, our social structure and cultural beliefs, and our domestic and foreign policies.

The Commission believes that the general principles and arrangements are best left to a small group of specialists. We suggest, therefore, the appointment of such a group, under the chairmanship of someone knowledgeable about American studies in the United States and experienced in China. The American Council of Learned Societies might be an appropriate organization to establish this group. □

Conclusions

7

Throughout this report we have presented a number of recommendations for the conduct of exchange programs. We return to the central recommendation. The great promise provided by the normalization of Sino–American relations is not likely to be realized without a much deeper understanding, each society of the other, than presently exists. Sustained scholarship—not only but certainly including the sort conducted by the humanities and the social sciences—will be necessary to this understanding. From an American perspective, the one unabashedly taken in this report, scholarship requires an active research presence. This research presence can accompany but differs in important respects from the teaching, lecturing, training, and technique-transferring role which the Chinese are inviting Americans to play. It can also accompany, but again significantly differs from, an exchange program, which may stress friendship or a particular cluster of foreign policy goals. To rest an exchange program on “what we can give to the Chinese to help them modernize” or on a “hands across the seas” sentiment would be to erode the core of what a scholarly exchange program provides: a contribution to a

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shared Sino–American capacity to understand the modern world, our respective roles in it, how it came to be, its intrinsic possibilities and likely limits, and thus to improve our ability diversely and separately to live in it. □

Appendix A

A Note on the Itinerary

The American Humanities and Social Science Planning Commission visited China from January 18 to 26, 1981. The Commission was hosted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

On November 5–6, 1981 the Commission held a briefing session. Harry Harding, professor of political science, Stanford University, presented an overview of the social sciences and humanities as presently organized and practiced in China; Michel Oksenberg, professor of political science, University of Michigan, presented an overview of the foreign policy context as it then influenced academic relations between China and the United States. There was a session devoted to exploring alternative models of organizing academic exchanges, which included commentary on American experiences with other developing countries as well as a presentation by Wesley A. Fisher, professor of sociology, Columbia University, and a consultant to the International Research and Exchanges Board, on current exchange programs with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Following these background briefings, the Commission heard from a panel of persons knowledgeable about different aspects of the exchange program. This panel was asked to comment on the experiences of their own institutions as well as to suggest to the panel what kind of a report would be most useful for the Commission to prepare. The panel included Harvey Averch, National Science Foundation; A. Doak Barnett, The Brookings Institution, and a member of the U.S.–China Joint Commission on Science and Technology; John Bresnan, Ford Foundation; Joel Colton, Rockefeller Foundation; Nancie L. Gonzalez, American Association for the Advancement of Science; Irving Shain, University of Wisconsin, and Richard Solomon, Rand Corporation and Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China.

The trip began with five days in Shanghai. The institutions visited included the Shanghai Library, Fudan University, Jiaotong University, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and the Shanghai municipal government.

Following the Shanghai stay, the delegation divided into three subgroups for visits to Guangzhou, Changchun, and Nanjing. In Guangzhou, visits were made to Zhongshan University, the Dali Commune, the Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences, and the Guangdong Provincial Bureau of Education. In Changchun, the group met with representatives of Jilin University, the Jilin pro-

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vincial branch of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the North-East Normal University, and the Jilin provincial government. In Nanjing, the group visited the University of Nanjing, the Taiping Museum, and the Number Two National Archives and met with representatives of the Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences.

The Commission spent the final week of the visit together in Beijing. The institutions visited included the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and many of its research institutes, the Ministry of Education, the *People's Daily*, Beijing University, Qinghua University, Beijing Normal University, the Beijing Institute of Foreign Languages, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the China Association of Science and Technology, the State Statistical Bureau, the Federation of Literary and Art Workers, and the Beijing Library. While in Beijing, the group also met with Vice Premier Bo Yibo.

While visiting these four cities, members of the group met singly and in small groups with several hundred Chinese scholars, political leaders, and academic officials. We would like to express our appreciation to all who shared their time and views with us. We would especially like to thank the representatives of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who constituted a counterpart group to our own, and who met with us on several occasions in Beijing. Their names and positions are listed in Appendix B.

We would also like to express our gratitude to the staff members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences who arranged our visit and travelled with us: Lin Qing, Chen Deren, Cao Dapeng, Jiang Qi, and Huang Qinghua.

Appendix B

Members of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Who Hosted the Commission

HUAN XIANG	Vice President
ZHAO FUSAN	Secretary General
	Committee on Foreign Academic Exchanges
WANG PING	Deputy Director, Bureau of Foreign Affairs
LIU DANIAN	Director, Institute of Modern History
LIN GANQUAN	Deputy Director, Institute of History
LIU SIMU	Director, Institute of World History
SUN SHANGQING	Deputy Director, Institute of Economics
YIN ZHONGPING	Deputy Director, Institute of Economics
FENG ZHI	Director, Institute of Foreign Literature
YA HANZHANG	Director, Institute of National Minority Studies
LI JINGXIAN	Deputy Director, Institute of Youth and Juvenile Studies
SHI GU	Responsible Person, Institute of World Economy and Politics
LI SHOUQI	Responsible Person, Institute of American Studies
LIU KEMING	Director, Institute of Soviet and East European Studies
CHEN DAO	Deputy Director, Institute of Sociology
LÜ SHUXIANG	Director, Institute of Linguistics
XING BENSI	Deputy Director, Institute of Philosophy
RU XIN	Deputy Director, Institute of Philosophy
ZHANG XIANYANG	Responsible Person, Institute of Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought
XIA NAI	Director, Institute of Archeology
SUN FANG	Deputy Director, Institute of Social Science Information
CHEN SHIWU	Deputy Director, Institute of Social Science Information
YU SHENGWU	Deputy Director, Institute of Modern History
LI XIN	Deputy Director, Institute of Modern History

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